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ABSTRACT
The behavior of stock prices around ex—dividend days has been suggested
as evidence for tax—induced clientele effects and as a means to estimate the
average effective tax rate faced by investors. In this paper these possi-
bilities are examined theoretically and empirically. Theoretically it is
shown that the measured price drop per dollar of dividend may provide a
biased estimate of the effective tax rate. Looking at the volume of trade
around ex—dividend days we show that the conditions under which it would
be unbiased are unlikely to hold. Strong evidence, based on a broader data
base than that used by previous investigators, is presented for the presence
of the clientele effect.
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This paper examines the behavior of common stock prices around ex—
dividend days. There are two basic questions on which this evidence might
be brought to bear: What is the market's valuation of capital within a firm?
Is this valuation systematically related to the mixture of investors who
ownthefirm's equity? In particular, is there a tendency for investors
in lower tax brackets to hold shares in companies with high dividend pay-
out rates, and, if so, is capital invested in such firms valued on the
margin above that in low payout companies?
At first glance, measuring the average fall in the price of a stock
per dollar of dividend paid would seem to be the perfect econometric ex-
periment to determine the value of a dollar retained In the corporation
relative to a dollar of investors' after tax personal income. Dividends
are announced approximately two weeks before the ex—dividend date, and
payment is made at a specified time, usually about one week later. In-
formation relevant to the corporation's financial position is often made
public at the same time the dividend is announced, but the intervening
time should surely be sufficient for the market to incorporate it into
the asset's price. Therefore, shortly before and after the ex—dividend
day, the corporation is, on average, identical in all respects except the
cash commitment necessary to pay stockholders. The change in its market
price at that date should reflect, on average, the investors' valuation
of this cash.
In a world where all investors are identical in their tax status,
one—day risks can be neglected and transaction costs are absent, the price
of the stock should fall by U—eY(1—) dollars for every dollar of divi——2—
*
dend,where 0 is the marginal tax rate on dividend income and c is the
effective marginal rate on capital gains. If there were a systematic tendency
for any larger fall, sure profits could be made by selling the stock on the
day before it goes ex—dividend and buying the day after.
Droppingt homogneityoftrswhilemaintaining all of the other assumptions
immediately creates difficulties. Applying the arbitrage argument above
separately to investors of each tax status we can see that no equilibrium
could exist. Whatever is the expected fall in the price of the stock per
dollar dividend, some tax category of investor will have a profitable arbitrage
possibility. It is therefore necessary to re—examine the basic trading mech-
anism that produces this type of result.
We note that the potential arbitrage profit is unlikely to
enable investors to overcome the transaction costs involved in the "round—
trip". Suppose, for example, that 0 =.5and c =0,butthat the stock falls
by a full dollar per dollar of dividend. The profit that could then be made
by selling the stock and repurchasing it after the dividend was paid would be
one half of the dividend yield. This represents a good upper bound on the
potential for speculative profit since the price fall must be between the
lowest 1—8/1—c faced by any investor and unity. Consider a stock paying
dividends at a 10% annual rate. Payments being made quarterly, the profit
potential is bounded by 1.25%. As a "round—trip" (buy and sell) transaction
is required, it can be seen that even for the largest investors the transaction
**
andadministrative costs involved make it a poor venture. Moreover, we
*
SeeAuerbach (1979), Bradford (1979) and King (1977). Note that we are, in
principal, discussing "marginal q", not "average q." No attempt will be made
to study the level of stock prices, see Bradford and Gordon (1979).
**
Professionaltraders and large investors with low transaction costs would make
a profit in this way. However tax rules governing "wash sales" and special pro-
visions for profits on the accounts of traders make 0 and c approximately equal,
reducing the profit potential eve further. Our data on the pattern of voluijne
around ex—dividend days (Section )suggeststhat short term arbitrage of this
type does not occur.—3—
tiave taken a rather extreme case here. If the fall in the price of the
stock is half—way between the lowest value of 1—0/1—c forany tax category
and unity, the maximum profit potential would be further cut in half.
To summarize, it seems unlikely that thearbitrage potential around
ex—dividend days can be large enough to makea significant number of
investors engage in such transactions ona regular basis. We are thereby
freed from the paradoxes attending the non—existenceof an equilibrium pattern of
prices. However, we are likewise left at a lossto explain these price movements
in terms of dividends and taxes. Worst ofall, the absence of arbitrage may
preclude the possibility of using the pricepattern to infer market valuations of
corporate capital. The extent to which such amethodology survives in a
world of heterogeneous investors isa principal theme of this paper.
Previous writers* investigating thisquestion were aware of the
difficulties I have just pointed out.They argued, however, that round—
trip trading is not necessary for arbitrageto be effective. Investors
who are planning to buy or sell thesecurity close to the ex—dividend date
may alter the timing of these transactions becauseof tax considerations.
However the economic decision
to adjust the trading date wasnot modeled in
any detail. Being primarily empirical, thesepapers concentrated on careful
statistical methodology,correcting for a variety of biases in the data.**
*
Themost explicit paper on thesepoints is Kalay (1978). Black andScholes (1973) also seem to have ascenario like this in mind.
**
Theseinclude roundoff problems due
to stock prices being quoted in discrete jumps of l2.5, differences between
opening and closing prices, correction for one—day expected returns, riskadjustments, and the discrepancy betweenpost— market closing implicit priceex—dividend and the observedopening price the following day. Portfolio theory andthe capital asset pricing modelprovide these authors with a theoretical
basis for dividing the securitiesinto strata that should correspond to the(unobservable) distribution of investors'tax rates.—4—
Our approach will be a rather different one. We will model the dynamics
of investors timing decisions explicitly. Based on this structure we will
derive the equilibrium behavior of prices on, and around, the ex—dividend day.
We will show that the measured price drop per dollar of dividend is,
under some special assumptions, an unbiased estimator of the average effective
tax rate facing the investors. However, if these assumptions are not satisfied,
a variety of possible biases are present.
We then present two empirical analyses that bear on this issue. First,
we show that the evidence for the clientele effect is strong. We estimate
that averaged over all companies a dollar of dividends is worth 70 cents.
However, this valuation varies strongly according to the companies' dividend yields.
A one standard deviation increase in dividend yield raises the valuation to
80 cents. In a world composed of investors taxed at either 70% or zero these
valuations translate into a dividend—induced shift from 42% to 28% taxable
share owners.
In the second empirical analysis we challenge the assumptions of the
model by looking for corroborative evidence on the pattern of trading volume.
The conclusions reached are rather negative. Companies display widely divergent
volume behavior near the ex—dividend date. This raises the possibility that the
tax composition of traders on those days differs markedly from what it is
at other times, and also from the composition of share owners. Estimation re-
sults based on data pooled across companies iiay be biased.'
We conclude that although a dividend—induced clientele effect is present,
the average effective tax rates of the owners cannot be accurately estimated
using the behavior of prices near ex—dividend days as evidence.
*
Usingonly one company will not give us enough information to generate
accurate parameter estimates. However, see Durand and May (1960) who find
that for AT&T stock the price drop is statistically not significantly different
from the dividend, during the period 1948—1959.—5—
2. A Two—Level Decision Process for Share Trading
In light of the discussion above, we hypothesize that the pattern of
stock prices around ex—dividend days arises from investors having a two—
level decision process as follows: First, the decision is made to acquire
or sell a stock. This is unrelated to the timing of payments of dividends.
Then, the actual execution of the transaction may be shifted over time so
that the stock is or is not held at the dividend record date.
One can imagine that in the absence of dividend—related considerations
there would be an optimal time to undertake the transaction. For example,
a sale to finance acquisition of another asset would be made at the date
that would minimize the expenses on transaction costs, including forgone
interest. If the motivation for the investor's decision is his perception
of information that has not yet (he believes) been fully incorporated in
the price of the security, then the optimal trading date is "as soon as
possible." Whatever the circumstances that cause the desire to trade, the
value of executinp the transaction is likely to decline if it is delayed.
On the other hand, liquidity considerations may make acceleration of trades,
particularly purchases, more costly than executing them at what otherwise
would be the optimal trading date. Costs of delay and acceleration will be
a key ingredient in our analysis of the behavior of stock prices around ex—dividend day
Let us suppose that the optimal transaction dates for the population of
investors are uniformly distributed over time, and that the level of the
stock's price is such that the number of orders to buy would be equal to
sell—orders on average. In the absence of any dividend —ortax—related
considerations the price of the stock would fluctuate without any predictable
dynamic pattern. Of course new information or changing conditions in related—6—
asset markets would induce continual fluctuations. Moreover, on any one
market day, the actual number of buyers might be different than the number
of sellers simply because the numbers involved are not very large,
even for rather heavily traded securities. Nevertheless, the absence of any
systematic pattern in stock prices would not alter the uniformity of the
arrival rates of orders to trade.
The situation becomes more complex when dividends and taxes are con-
sidered. Let us define a price pattern around an ex—dividend date to be
an equilibrium if it induces a pattern of arrival rates for buy—orders over
time that matches the arrival rates for sell—orders on a day—by—day basis.
One should note that there is no requirement for these arrival rates to be
constant over time. Their common fluctuations in equilibrium will induce a
pattern of daily trading volume. Volume data are thus useful for a test of
this model and for the interpretation of its conclusions regarding clientele
effects.
It is important to point out that the equality of arrival rates for
buy and sell orders does not imply that these rates are the same for every
tax category of investor. Those in one situation may, for example be post-
poning some of their sales, while others may be postponing purchases. At
another point in time their roles might be reversed.
We will now go on to a presentation of two models,
admittedly great oversimplifications of reality, in which the equilibrium
pattern of stock prices and trading volume are derived based on the consid-
erations mentioned above. These models will then serve as the backdrop
against which the empirical parts of the paper can be viewed.—7--
3. Structure of the Model
Investors and Trades
There are two tax categories of investors, the taxedgroup called
A and the untaxed group, called B. A's pay dividend and capital gains taxes.
Let (1—0) by the ratio of the net of tax value of $1 of dividends to the net
of tax value of $1 of capital gains. The investors occasionally desire to trade
securities on the market. Orders for such trades arrive at random. We
distinguish four types of orders according to the identity of the trader,
A or B, and according to the direction of trade, buy or sell. To have a
symbolic notation for the latter distinction we write + for buying and —
forselling. The arrival rates that would arise in the absence of tax
or dividend considerations are thus denoted
XA+ XA XB+ AB
for the four groups respectively. Because we imagine that the composition
of investors who own the security is changing very slowly if at all, it is






Time is described by a discrete sequence of periods denoted by
t =..., —2,—1, 0, +1, +2 The date at which dividends are no longer
paid to new owners of the security is called the ex—dividend date and is—8—
associated with t=0.Thus the last date at which a new owner is entitled
to the dividend is t=—1;and the day before that is t=—2,etc.
Costs of Distorted Trading Dates
As discussed in the last section, a principal determinant of the
equilibrium pattern of expected prices around the ex—dividend day is the
cost of trading at a date other than that which would be the individual's
optimum. These costs will be denoted by a function g(s) where s measures
the deviation from the optimal trade date. The variable s is positive if
trade is delayed until after the optimum and negative if trade is accelerated.
Without loss of generality we can take g(0) =0.Ifs11 <1s21,
then 0
g(s1)g(s)
The principal determinant of the pattern of prices will be the distri-
bution of these costs in the population of traders. We will allow for dif-
ferent distributions of costs within the four types of traders A+, A—, B+, B—.
For example, let hA÷s() be the distribution function of the costs of delay
(acceleration) of s days within the population of taxable buyers. That is,
hA÷s() =prob(g(s) for a taxable buyer).
Similarly we define the distribution functions hA(.), hB+s(), hB.s(),
for each date s.
The Timing Decision
The dividend will be normalized to $1 throughout our analysis.—9—
We consider now a single trader with a cost functiong(s). To make
our analysis of his trading decision concrete, let ussuppose that he is a
taxable buyer (A+).
This individual is embedded in a system in which the path of expected
prices around the ex—dividend day is known to be
p(—2), p(—l), p(O), p(+i), p(+2),
The total cost of buying shares before the ex—dividend date is the
price paid plus the cost of the timing decision, if any, minus the after—
tax value of the dividend. If we are considering a date t <0and the
optimal trading date for the individual is t', we have
(2) p(t) + g(t —t')—(1—) ift <0
On or after the ex—dividend date we have
(3) p(t) + g(t —t') if t0
The overall minimum cost of acquisition for a taxable buyer occurs on the
date t for which the lowest value of (2)or(3)isreached. Qn the basis
of this calculation we can see how the investor will shift his purchase
date from t' to t.
For taxable sellers and untaxed traders of either type, calculations
precisely analagous to these can be made. A different pattern of shifting
trades around the desired date would be implied.
Equilibrium
We began by assuming that the desired purchase dates were uniformly
distributed in the absence of taxation or dividends. The analysis above— 10—
makes it clear that this uniformity cannot be expected of the actual trading
dates when taxes and dividends are relevant.
If investors perceive that the price sequence will be p =(... p(—2),
p(—l), p(O), p(l), p(2), ...)thenthey may be induced to shift from their
otherwise optimal trading date to some other date. The actual rate of arrival
of orders to trade at date t by taxable buyers is the sum of the arrival rates
for optimal trades at t' multiplied by the probability that this investor
will switch from t' to t.
Let these actual arrival rates be denoted aA÷(t), aA(t), aB+(t), aB_(t).
It is important to note that each rate depends upon p and is propor-
tional to the corresponding undistorted arrival rate A. The nature of the
dependence is complex because it varies with the distributions of costs h()
in the different populations of traders.
In an equilibrium we have the equality of the aggregate arrival rates





4. Equilibria in Various Special Cases
General Remarks
Before examining the kinds of equilibria that are possible and the im-
plications of each for the underlying questions of tax induced investor self—
selection and firm valuation, a few general remarks are in order. The fall
in stock prices on the ex—dividend date is well—documented. Questions con-
cern whether it differs from one firm to another in a systematic manner related
to tax considerations. Apart from the one—day drop in prices several inves—
tigators*have considered theaverage yields over longer holding periods.
Intervals containing the ex—dividend day and intervals entirely on one side
or the other have been considered. The findings are tentative, but they do
seem to reveal some systematic price fluctuation on days other than the ex—
dividend day.
We will see below that our theory can accomodate such fluctuations;
but they cannot be usedto make inferences about the underlying
questions of interest because one cannot identify the parameters of the rele-
vant costs of delay and acceleration.
We now turn to some special cases of interest in which the basic issues
can be discussed. First we take a model in which there is only delay and not
acceleration. The equilibrium conditions will be weakened slightly to allow
us to ignore all anticipated price fluctuations except those taking place on
the ex—dividend date itself.
Model I
Here we assume that p(t), t =0, hasonly two distinct values;
it is constant before the ex—dividend date and from the ex—dividend date onward.
*
The most extensive analysis can be found in Black and Scholes (1973) whocon-
sider seven different strategies for round triptrading near the ex—dividend date
for each of ten portfolios. Durand and May (1960) alsopresent evidence for a two
week interval around the dividend date, for AT&T stock only.—12—
Let
x =p(—l)—p(O)
bethe price drop in response to the $1 dividend payment.





=0for all s <0and all .In
this way costs of acceleration are effectively infinite for all groups.
Because the price sequence is assumed to have such a simple form, the
only equilibrating variable being x, we must relax our equilibrium conditions
slightly. Instead of requiring an exact, day—by—day, equality of arrival
rates as in (4)we will say that x is in equilibrium if the fraction of
people who delay purchases from one side of the ex—dividend to the other
equals the fraction of those who similarly delay sales.
The special form of p and the assumptions we have already made on g(.)
make it relatively easy to write this equilibrium condition explicitly. Any
delay will come from taxable buyers (A+) and untaxed sellers (B—). No one
who delays will execute his trade before the ex—dividend date. Indeed all
delayed trades will be executed on the ex—dividend date. Any further delay
is costly because p() is constant, and g(.) is increasing.
Therefore equilibrium requires that
S S
(5) AA+ hA÷s (x —(1—
ABE hB_,s(l_x)
s=l s=l
where S is a number sufficiently far in the past that g(S) >max(x—(l—O),l—x)
for all traders.
S S




The equilibrium value of x is determined completely by XA+ XB_ and these two
functions.—13—
The comparative statics of x are easily studied by examining (4 )and
noting that HA÷() and HB(•) are increasing functions. Therefore x is
decreasing in AA+, increasing in and decreasing in 0. The more heavily
trade is dominated by taxable traders, the more x reflects their tax rate
and is therefore smaller. The more heavily taxed the owners of the security
are, the smaller the price drop per dollar of dividend.
Some special remarks are relevant to the treatment of capital gains taxes
in the above analysis. We have used 1—0 to represent the ratio of the net
of tax dividend yield to the net of tax capital gains yield. If more of the
investors have a higher capital gains tax rate, the effective change In 1—0
is upward and x should increase. In periods following an increase in the
stock's price, more of the sellers are likely to be liable for capital gains
taxation. Therefore, even in periods when the statutory tax rates are fixed
the effective rate for our model will vary. It will be different from one
* investorto another ,andit will tend to be negatively related to the stock's
current price compared with the past level at which purchases may have been
**
made.
To summarize this discussion, it is fair to say that we have given a
theory, though admittedly restrictive in its assumptions, which explains the
price decline on ex—dividend days in an equilibrium model where investors
have heterogenous tax rates. The qualitative behavior of the model seems
sensible, and It is robust to generalizations such as more than two tax
categories of investors, etc.
*
Seethe empirical treatment of this problem below.
**
Thecomplexity of U.S. tax laws regarding carryover provisions and the of f—
set rules relating short and long term gains and losses to ordinary income make
it impossible to give a systematic quantitative treatment of this problem with-
out longitudinal tax return data. Nevert1eless in thenext section we discuss an approximate method of dealing with it using only market data.—14—
We now turn to the question of whether l—x, as measured, can serve to
represent the average tax rate applicable to the investors in the company.
It is clear that the answer is, in general, no. Therefore we will try to
examine the sources and directions of possible biases. Let the fraction of
shares owned by the taxed and untaxed groups be and ctB respectively.
Consider the case in which the costs of delay are identical from one
group to another and the arrival rates for optimal trade dates (A) are pro-
portional to share ownership (a), Further let us assume that the (common)
H(S)functionis linear within the relevant range
(6) H() =
Directsubstitution into (4 )impliesthat
(7) x1—aë
This is one minus the weighted average of the tax rates for the two groups.
Relaxing each of the assumptions under which the above result holds
reveals the directions of possible bias. We take these one at a time.
1. A÷/X <all—a
This might reflect a lower propensity to trade among taxable investors
than among the untaxed. Several factors might operate in this direction.
Untaxed investors have no problems with "lock—in" effects due to capital gains
taxation at realization. To the extent that they are large institutions such
as pension funds they may have lower transaction costs. There is someevi-
dence that the volume of trade due to "institutions" is greater than their
share of stock ownership, but "institutions" are not all tax—exempt, as they—15—
include life insurance companies, banks trading for trust accounts and mutual
funds, all of whom are taxed. I know of no direct evidence available on the
proposition as stated, but thexe may be some reason to believe it.
This hypothesis would cause x to exceed 1 —ctO.That is, x as measured
would be biased towards one.
2. <
HB_
For reasons similar to those above, taxable investors, whose holding
periods tend to be longer, might be less sensitive to relatively minor profit
opportunities at the cost of some delay. Similarly, to the extent that they
have less trading activity relative to their total wealth, they may have
higher liquidity costs and therefore more reason not to deviate from their
optimal trading dates. This difference in delay costs can be approximated








Thusthis effect, if present, will reinforce the trading frequency effect
studied in 1. above.










which again represents an upward bias.
3. Nonhinearities in H(.)
The assumption that H() is linear over the relevant range is, of course
an approximation. The simplest modification to (6) would involve equal
positive shifts and, as we saw in (8) would not give rise to any bias.
While I see no compelling theoretical reason to suppose that H is either
concave or convex, an argument for convexity can be made as follows, and it
may be of interest to explore its implications for the bias in x.
* Evidencefor the postponement of trades is weak.Therefore we may
suppose that the costs of delay are large for most people. If the distribution
of delay costs for every delay interval is unimodal, H will be convex below
the mean. If we take, for example,
H() =+
with ,y >0,it is possible to compute the equilibrium value for x. For
moderate values of y the bias can go in either direction, and it tends to
be small. However when y is large andis small x approaches 1 —l±
which is less than l—cO.Thusa very strong convexity of H may impart a bias
in the opposite direction from those indicated above.
*
Thisof course means net delays over accelerations of trades. The latter are
ruled out here by assumtTon, but see the next subsection: Model II.—17—
Model II
In this model we introduce the possibility thattrading dates are accel-
erated as well as delayed. Costs of accelerationare allowed to differ from
costs of delay. We will show that the presence of acceleration doesnot in-
troduce a bias in the estimate ofaverage tax rates under the maintained hy-
pothesis that cumulative cost distributions can be linearlyapproximated and
are the same across investor tax statuses.
We study such a model not merely for thesake of in-
creased generality. In Section 6 evidence on the volumepattern around ex—
dividend days will be presented. It will be shown that thedelay—only model cannot
be correct. Therefore it is necessary to examinea model whose equilibrium
could be consistent with the observed trading volumesaround ex—dividend days.
As in Model I we will assume that expectedprices take a single downward
jump on the ex—dividend date. Delay will be due exclusivelyto taxable buyers
and untaxed sellers, and acceleration will be dueto untaxed buyers and taxed
sellers. In equilibrium the value of x mustequalize the net delay by buyers
to that by sellers, where net delay is the excess ofdelay over acceleration.
A taxable seller whose optimal trade date iss >0will accelerate his
trade to t=—lif
g(s+l) <x—(1—0)
And an untaxed buyer will accelerate if
g(s+l) <1—x
Net delay by buyers is thus—18—
XA+HA+(X -(1-0))-
andnet delay be sellers is
XBHB(lx) —XAHA (x —(1—0))
where HB+(.) and HA(•) are defined in an analagous manner to HA+(.) and HB().
Using C 1 ) the equilibrium condition becomes
XA+CHA+(X -(1-0))+ HA(x -(1-0)))
=
ABB(1X)+ HB+(l_x))
It is evident that this is qualitatively the same as ( 5 ). Let us investigate
whether a bias in x results when delay costs differ from acceleration costs, but
each is the same across the two tax groups. We continue to assume linearity in
H(). Thus for traders who delay we have
HA+() =HB()
and for those who accelerate trades:
HA() =HB÷()
=
Alsomaintain the unbiased trading propensity assumption th A=c foreach grwp. Equilibrium
requires precisely the same condition as in the delay—only case:x =l—c0.
Thusdifferential costs of acceleration and delay do not cause a bias in the
value of x under these assumptions.—19—
Summary: Sources of bias in x as a measure of 1 —aO
We have seen that there are several possible sources of bias inusing the
price drop on the ex—dividend date as a measure of the average effective dividend
yield compared to the capital gains yield. The likely deviations from the un-
biased case are:
1. Trading propensities (A) can differ from investor compositions (cs),
with untaxed investors.
2. Costs of delay and acceleration for taxable tradersmay exceed those
for the untaxed.
3. Non—linearities in H.
In both 1. and 2. the effect is to bias x toward 1.In 3. the effect can go
either way. Therefore, a finding that x is significantly different from 1 is
reinforced by our belief that 1 and 2 stay be operative. Kalay's (1978) esti-
mate that x is not significantly different from 1 should be reassessed in this
light as well.—20—
5. Empirical Measurement of Clientele Effect by x
The theoretical analysis of the last section can be summarized as follows:
Biases in the use of x to estimate the average tax rate may be present. However,
under the hypothesis that relative costs of delay and acceleration across
investor tax categories do not differ from one company to another, comparisons
of x across companies can be used to detect the presence of clientele effects.
Furthermore, the extent to which x is below unity can be ascribed to tax—induced
preferences for capital gains as opposed to dividends.
In this section we present the results of an empirical investigation Into
these issues.
Roughly speaking, the theory tells us that
P(0) —P(—l)=— {averageeffective (---)}xDIV
+ other variables unrelated to the dividend
+ error.
As an approximate correction for heteroscedasticity we assume that the
error is proportional to P(—l), but is otherwise the same across companies.
The principal variables on which we focus are those that might "explain"
the effective tax rate. We tried four explanatory variables:
I) l) the ratio of the quarterly dividend to price
ii)
J'(l)quarterly earnings per share divided by price
iii)(1 —FRACINST)the fraction of investors classified as "non—
institutional"
iv) T a synthetic variable designed to capture the taxation of
capital gains at realization only, and the special tax rules
that apply. This variable is discussed further below.—21—
Thespecification of the clientele effect is that the fraction of taxable
traders is
(9) a0 + c +a2 EARN + a (1 —FRACINST)
P
We expect a1 to be negative because taxable investors should be holding firms
whose return, other things equal, will arise in the form of capital gains
rather than dividends. The sign of a2 is ambiguous. To the extent that the
"security" of the dividend is more important to taxable rather than untaxed
investors, It would be positive. But this might well go the other way. Finally,
a3 should be positive if our FRACINST variableis measuring anything that is not
already picked up by the other variables.
The theory suggests that the average effective is the weighted
average of T and 1, with the weight on T given by C9).
For"other variables" we used the performance of the Standard and Poors
500 stock index, in the form of its percentage change from the previous day's
value. The idea is to capture market—wide information and related events.
This variable is called MKT.
Thus we have









+(l—T) (l—FRAC INST) • + MKT+
Equation(11) is our basic estimating equation.
The Data
*
Ourdata on price changes and dividends are observations on 29 Dow—Jones
companies from July 1962 —December1977. These were selected from the CRISP
tape. Data on earnings were taken from the COMPUSTAT file. FRACINST is taken
from the Standard and Poor's Stock Guide.
The computation is made somewhat complicated by the fact that the CRISP
tape lists distributions separately even though they may have occurred on the
**
sameday. For example special dividends are often paid on the sameday and
to the same holder3 of record as ordinary dividends. The observed price
change, of course, reflects the effects of both distributions. In each observation
the value of --is the actual dividend paid at that point in time. To the
extent that dividends in different quarters are unequal, the proportion of
taxable shareholders may reflect the average expected dividend yield rather
than the actual payment at that date. Similarly, if there are lags in inves-
tors portfolio adjustments for tax reasons, a company that has just raised
its dividend payment will have more taxable shareholders than the observed
DIV
would predict. Therefore the aggregation of special dividends with
ordinary quarterly dividends paid on the same date will "overcorrect" the
underestimate of annual yield by in the other three quarters. For this
reason we present two sets of regressions, one for "ordinary dividends only"
*
Chryslerwas deleted because of the irregularity of its divid. Including
observations on Chrysler would have biased the results because —p---, when a dividend
was paid, was not a good proxy for the anticipated long—term dividend yield. Thus
(9) would have been misspecified.
**
Previousauthors who worked with this data did not state how they handled
this problem.—23—
in which we deleted observations where more than one distribution occurred
on the same day, and one for "all dividend distributions" in which the dividends
are added together and treated as a single observation. There were only 36 such
coincident distributions in the 15 year period that the data cover.
The results of the estimation of (11) are given in Tables 1, 2 and 3. The most
striking result is the very strong significance of as a predictor of the




variable is always insignificant. The behavior of (1 —FRACINST)
is rather curious. Overall it has little effect. When the sample is divided
into two subperiods July '62 —December'70 and January '71 —December'77,
this variable is very significant in each but with opposite signs. The in-
stitutions whose ownership is measured by this variable are quite heterogeneous
in nature, including insurance companies, bank trust departments, pension funds
and mutual funds. Some of these represent investors who are not taxed, while
others, such as insurance companies, have complex tax rules which cause the
"effective" to be sensitive to other components of their annual income
even though the statutory tax rates are constant. It is possible that the
behavior of this variable is affected by the uneven pattern with which different
institutions acquired shares. However the estimated coefficients diverge so
widely that such an explanation really does not suffice.
Several things should by observed.
1. Our theory suggests that the constant term should be suppressed. Over the
whole sample period this specification is borne out. But again the two sub—
periods behave in a markedly different fashion.
2. The use of our synthetic tax variable had little impact. For each year we
computed a weighted average realized return on Standard and Poors stock
average over the previous five years. This was to reflect whether the—24—
typical seller had a capital gain to "protect". We then scaled a variable "C"
sothat it was equal to the statutory maximal capital gains rate when the largest
gains had been experienced, and equal to zero when the largest average
loss occurred.The variable 0 was set equal to the statutory
maximum tax rate on personal interest income. (Federal tax rates were used;
taxation at the state level was ignored.) Our synthetic T was computed as
10
as the theory suggests.
One might question why c was computed on a market wide basis rather than separately
for each security. The reason is that we imagine the active traders to be
large ones. Their tax status in any year depends on their overall net long—
term gains. Thus, for example, the effective capital gains tax on the marginal
dollar of proceeds from selling a stock at a loss is the capital gains rate
if he has taken other gains in the same year, but is close'to zero if the investor's
net losses exceed the allowable maximum. Obviously, the crudeness of this
calculation may be obscuring the true effects of tax rate fluctuations.
Nevertheless we believe that this approach is faithful to the theory, and
preferable to using similarly created "stock—by--stock" effective maximal tax
rates.
3. The real goal of our exercise was to compute two quantities: The measured
effective tax rate and the sensitivity of this rate to the firm's dividend
policy. Tables 1,2 and 3 display these quantities for each equation. In the first of
the two columns at the right we give the measured at the mean
of the right—hand side variables:
(l—T){a0 +lP+ °2
EARN+ (l—FRACINST)}
In the final column we show how this magnitude would vary when PfLis increased by one—25—
standard deviation. For example, in Table 1, the mean of the quarterly
dividend divided by price was .98% and its standard deviation was .41%.
Thus these columns compare the measured 4—-forhypothetically identical
stocks whose (ordinary) dividend yield varies from an annual rate of 3.92%
to 5.56%. Such a change increases -[-roughlyfrom .71 to .80, the exact
amount varying slightly with the specification.
This is rather strong evidence for the clientele effect. It is a
stable relationship across subperiods despite the instability in the FRACINST
coefficient. Indeed it does not vary with the specification except in those
cases where a constant is included, and there it is completely irregular in
behavior.
To correct for possible errors in the specification we also ran the same
regressions as those reported in Tables 1, 2 and 3 including dummy variables for
each company. In general this had very little effect on the estimated
effective tax rates or their sensitivity to dividend yields. Of the 29
dummy variables only five were significant at the 5% level. These were
DuPont and Texaco, withlower average returr and General Electric, United























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Comparison with Other Results
Three prevLous studies are similar to this one.Elton and Gruber (1970)
used a sample of all NYSE traded stocks with positive volume on days before
and after the ex—dividend date in the period April 1, 1966 —March31, 1967.
They had 4148 observations. Kalay (1978) used a subsample of 2540 of these
but does not state how the sample was drawn. Elton and Gruber find strong
evidence for a clientele effect while Kalay does not. Both studies fail to
recognize that this period was one of high share prices which made capital
gains rates higher than usual and would have biased toward one.
Black and Scholes (1973) use a much more extensive data set consisting
of 36152 observations on all NYSE stocks in the period July 2, 1962 —December
30, 1970. They note significant differences between the clientele effects as
measured over separate six month intervals within this period, but they do not
attempt to attribute these differences to variations in the effective capital
gains rate.
The most important difference between these data sets and ours is our
concentration on the Dow Jones stocks. By using all securities on the NYSE
and weighting all observations equally, much of the evidence is based on thinly
traded issues where trades take place for reasons quite unrelated to the divi-
dend. Kalay and Black—Scholes attempt to correct for some of the problems
with thinly traded issues by modelling the t'true" post—closing ex—dividend
price on the day before the ex—dividend date. But this is only a part of the
problem. We preferred to take a set of securities that are always actively
traded and about which information is widely disseminated and actively sought.
*Otherrelevant references with different basic approaches are Barker (1959),
Campbell and Beranek (1955), Durand and May (1960) and Readett (1956).—31--
The availability of 15 years of data, giving us over 1800 observations made
the estimation feasible, and, we believe, more accurate than the previous
studies despite the somewhat smaller sample size.—32—
6. Evidence on the Pattern of Volume of Trade Around Ex—Dividend Days
Both Model I and Model II have implications for the pattern of trading
volume. We therefore have made a separate study of this question. The re—
suits are reported in this section.
Even the most cursory glance at the volume of trade reveals the volatility
and apparent unpredictability of these data. Our model would suggest that
there are three determinants of trading volume: general "news" or
the resolution of uncertainties not specific to the company, company—specific
events not connected with the payment of dividends, and dividends, either in
the recent past or in the near future.
The persistence of disturbances in volume is equally evident. Individual
investors do not continually hold the market portfolio, nor do they hold on
to a fixed portfolio whose mean and variance approximates that of the market
portfolio. It seems to me that there is prima facie evidence that expectations
are heterogenous and that investors hold what they believe will dominate the
market portfolio on average. Moreover, the persistence of volume can be
taken as an indication that individuals do not believe in the extreme version
of the efficient markets hypothesis ——orelse that there are so many "insiders"
that one wonders who the "outsiders" must be. In any case, whatever the true
portfolio theory model might be, we must allow for autocorrelation of errors
in equations designed to predict volume.
Estimating Volume for Each Company
For each of the Dow Jones stocks one could imagine estimating the following
regression:—33—
Log vol =Const÷Time+ Log mkt.vol + c
The idea is that "general information" shows up in the volume of the 28 other
companies, mkt.vol, and to the extent that this causes trade in the stock
in question mkt.vol will proportionately influence vol. Because companies
differ in how closely they are related to the market, one would expect this
constant—of—proportionality to vary, and it does so significantly. The
presence of time in the equation is to capture the secular increase or de-
crease in the trading of this stock compared with the other Dow Jones companies
taken together. The error term, c, is assumed to follow a first—order auto-
regressive process.
There would be a problem with this autocorrelation correction precisely
because of the fact that systematic fluctuations in volume around the ex—
dividend day would be picked up by the autocorrelation parameter. This would
bias the estimated coefficients and lead to incorrect results when we try to
analyze the residuals of this equation on a daily basis.
To overcome this difficulty we excluded from the data base a seven trading
day sequence around the ex—dividend date——fromt =—3to t =+3.
For each company the data consists of a collection of intervals between t =+4
for one dividend and t =—4for the next dividend. The volume data we have
come from the DRISEC data base of Data Resources, Inc. They cover the time
period January 1, 1968 —December31, 1977.
The companies in our sample paid around 40 quarterly dividends in this
interval. All distributions other than regular quarterly dividends were ignored, for
reasons that will be apparent shortly. Between each quarterly dividend there—34—
are about 71 trading days. As 7 of these are eliminated, there are, in all
about 64 trading days in each sequence. Thus the data for each company are
roughly 40 continuous sequences of 64 days each. The basic equation is esti-
mated by pooling these sequences
When one does this, however, there is a danger that systematic variations
in volume over the quarterly cycle that are not accounted for in the estimating
equation, might bias the coefficients. Examples of possible omitted variables
include dates at which earnings of companies in related industries are announced,
days on which various periodic government announcements are made, tax dates,
holidays, etc. Because every company is different in these regards, it would
be impossible and misleading to try to uncover the true causes of such systematic
fluctuations for all of them.
To account for these possibilities we introduced four cyclical variables:
tTt tU tu tir . sin-,sin
--,cos
---,cos
--,allowingfor periodicities equal to the
quarterly cycle and equal to half the quarterly cycle. By combining these,
considerable flexibility in the form of allowable cyclic behavior could be
achieved.
In addition we use two dummy variables for specific days: the day on
which the dividend is announced, and the day after that. This announcement
date precedes the payment of the dividend by 5 —10days in most cases. Often,
other information relevant to the company's earnings is announced at the same
time. The day after the announcement date also could have special properties.
Time zone differences between New York and the corporate headquarters can make
this date the first one which is really relevant for announcement—induced—35—
trades. Or, more simply, delays in learning the news may create enough of a
time lag so that the trade may not be executed until the following day.
Holidays and weekends must be accomodated somehow. We followed the rather
straightforward approach of deleting them and treating Monday as directly
following Friday for the purpose of autocorrelation. A practical matter of
some importance in this data is that in 1968—1969 there were about 20 con-
secutive Wednesdays on which the exchange was closed due to massive paperwork
backlogs. As these are not officially "holidays," they had to be deleted by
hand from our sample. Here also, we assume that Tuesday and Thursday are adjacent,
with the same autocorrelation parameter operative as between any other days.
Results
The resulting parameter estimates are shown In Table 5. These equations
explain some of the volume fluctuation, but many of the variables discussed
above are generally Insignificant. Typically, only the inkt.vol and the auto—
correlation correction have real predictive content.
Our procedure was to use these estimated relations to project a "predicted
volume" for each of the seven trading days in between the end of one quarterly
cycle and the start of the next. Then the residuals of these relations are
summed over all the quarterly cycles separately for each day in this seven
day interval.
To assess whether delay or acceleration of trades is the rule, we group
together the three days before the ex—dividend date t =—3,—2, —l and the four
days on and after it t =0,+1, +2, +3. For each of the 29 companies we
divided the average of these residuals by the standard deviation that that—36—
average would have under the hypothesis that they were residuals from a
correctly specified regression with the given standard error.
For example, take Allied Chemical on the 3 days preceding the dividend.
The average of the 120 (=3days x 40 dividends) residuals is =.1806.The
standard error of the Allied Chemical regression is .565. Therefore, under the
hypothesis that each residual is an independent drawing from a distribution
with mean zero and this standard deviation, the standard error of theaverage
would be .0516. Thus, Allied Chemical has on average 3.5 (= standard
deviations less volume on these 3 days than would be predicted under the no—delay
no—acceleration hypothesis.
The results of these calculations are displayed in Table 6. Before
discussing these results, some additional comments are in order.
The sample size for each company is quite large. Therefore it is
appropriate to neglect uncertainty about the standard error of the regression
in performing these calculations. There is a problem, however, in using this
standard error to represent the error in forecasting several days into the
interval because of the autocorrelation correction. We look at the residual
of the estimating equation on t =—4and then apply the autocorrelation parameter
successively on each of the following days to get the predicted value used above.
Thus these projected values are not based on the same exogenous variables as the
prediction equations and the standard error of the errors in these projections
is understated.
To examine the extent of this error we look at the standard error of the
estimating equation without correcting for autocorrelation at all. In the case
of Allied Chemical it as .6127. Thus an upper bound on the standard error of thearage—37—
deviation over the 3 pre—dividend days is .0559. This upper bound is a better
approximation to the true error for the 4 post—dividend days than for the pre—
dividend days. We will see below that this error in estimating the standard
error under the null hypothesis cannot explain the divergence of our results from
what would be observed if there were no dividend—induced changes in trading dates.
Turning to Table 6 we see that there are several salient features of
these residuals. The variance of the pre—dividend residuals is much greater
than that of the post—dividend residuals, even though, as noted above, the
standard error of the regression is more severely underestimated for the latter
than for the former.This indicates that the divergence from expected
volume experienced before the dividend does not necessarily show up in the
opposite bias after the dividend. The two level decision process that we
have used to set up the theoretical model in Sections 2 and 3 is indirectly
challenged by this finding. However it may be that the timing decision is
varied by more than the three or four days implicitly assumed when we selected
the interval from t =—3to t =+3for our study.
Another thing to note is the obvious non—normality of these residuals,
despite the fact that each is already an average of 120 —160errors from the
prediction equation. There must be other factors operating, particularly in
the days just before the dividend, which vary from company to company.
We compared the companies with unusually large volume deviations to those
that displayed atypical price behavior as evidenced by the coefficients in the
dummy variable regressions discussed at the end of Section 5. However there
was no particular ccncidence among them. We were unable to discover anything
via this route which might point to a potential for bias in the estimate of the—38—
effective tax rates.
The overall level and pattern of these residuals would point to two facts.
The period around the ex—dividend date is quieter, than one would expect,
even after correction for the cyclical pattern of volume has been made. And
acceleration of trades, rather than delay, seems prevalent.
These conclusions are heavily influenced by large residuals for several
companies. The analysis of errors in the absence of normality has lead statis-
ticians to employ what are called "robust" methods. The idea is not to let
the thick tails of the underlying distribution have an undue influence on the
estimate. One such method is to truncate any observations that are outside a
fixed deviation from the sample mean down to this upper bound level. We em-
ployed a variety of such methods and the results were largely unaffected.
Acceleration, on average, is more important than delay. Actual volume after
the ex—dividend date is surely below its predicted level even allowing for the
underestimation of standard errors discussed above. Before it, volume is
close to that predicted, the precise estimate depending on the truncation point
used.
The incompleteness of our specification has doubtlessly hidden many
company—specific effects. Nevertheless the fact that volume patterns around
ex—dividend days are atypical is very apparent. We must, therefore be sus-
picious that the composition of investors who are executing trades on these
dates is not the cross—section of all the company's stockholders. This fact
is perhaps a much more severe source of potential bias than asymmetries in
delay and acceleration costs across tax categories. In conclusion, therefore,
this study of trading volume reinforces our theoretically based conclusions
that the observed price drop per dollar of dividend cannot be used to measure
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Company 3 Pre—Dividend DaysEx—dividend Date and
3 Following Days—43—
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